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Abstract
Do contractual frictions matter when rms are engaged in repeated interactions? This paper argues
that long-term relationships, which allow rms to (partly) overcome the static costs associated with low
contractibility, will under certain circumstances create dynamic ine¢ ciencies. We consider the repeated
interaction between nal good producers and intermediate input suppliers, where the provision of the
intermediate input is noncontractible. A producer/supplier pair can be a good match or a bad match,
with bad matches featuring lower productivity. This allows us to build a cooperative equilibrium where
producers can switch suppliers and start cooperation immediately with new suppliers. Every period,
one supplier has the opportunity to innovate, and in the baseline model, innovations are imitated after
one period. We show that (i) innovations need to be larger to break up existing relationships in the
cooperative equilibrium than in either a set-up where the input is contractible or when we preclude
cooperation in long-term relationships, (ii) the rate of innovation in the cooperative equilibrium is
lower than in the contractible case, and may even be lower than in the non-cooperative equilibrium and
(iii) cooperation may reduce welfare. Next, we assume that the frontier technology di¤uses slowly to
suppliers (instead of after one period). In that case, for su¢ ciently slow di¤usion, the innovation rate
in the cooperative equilibrium may be higher than even in the contractible case. Finally, we show that
cooperation may also increase relationship specic innovations.
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1 Introduction
Do contractual frictions matter when rms are engaged in repeated interactions? There is
widespread evidence that rms rely on relational contracts in order to ensure cooperation from
their partners when legal contracts cannot be fully enforced. Yet recent work in the growth and
trade literature has emphasized the central role that formal contractual enforcement plays in
shaping income and growth di¤erences across countries. Is there something fundamental about
relational contracts that prevents them from being a good substitute for e¤ective institutions?
In this paper, we argue that the establishment of relational contracts creates rigidities in ex-
isting relationships, which are detrimental to economic growth. Firms engaged in relational
contracting (that is, in implicit agreement relying on mutual trust) may be reluctant to switch
to a new potential partner with a better technology, if the expected level of cooperation with
this potential new partner is lower than with a long-standing one. In this case, the market size
for a potential innovator is reduced, which in turn, reduces the incentive to innovate. Then,
relational contracts are a poor substitute for good institutions, because they turn contractibil-
ity issues from a static problem of ine¢ cient allocation of resources into a dynamic problem
of ine¢ cient development of technologies. This paper claries this trade-o¤ but also derives
conditions under which it does not apply. We focus on growth and innovation, but more gen-
erally, relational contracts, requiring long-term relationships, can come at odds with economic
e¢ ciency, whenever the economy would benet from exible relationships (for instance in the
adjustment to macroeconomic shocks).
We have in mind an industry with the following characteristics: (i) production requires the
participation of producers and suppliers, where the suppliers provide complex inputs designed
specically for the nal good producer, (ii) suppliers are competing with each other, and
(iii) innovations allow them to escape competition and to increase their market share at
the expense of their competitors. In a non-repeated framework, non-contractibility of the
intermediate input typically creates an ex post hold-up situation leading to underinvestment
by the supplier as in Grossman and Hart (1986). In a repeated framework, if producer-supplier
pairs were in isolation from each other, classic trigger strategies would easily allow for higher
level of investment than in a one shot-interaction. However, if producers can switch suppliers
and start cooperating with a new partner costlessly, achieving cooperation in the rst place is
more di¢ cult, as producers could deviate without being punished. What makes cooperation
possible in our set-up is the existence of good and bad matches between producers and suppliers,
where good matches are characterized by a higher productivity level. The nature of the match
is unknown to both parties before they start working together and it does not change over time.
If a match turns out to be good, the value of the relationship in the following period is higher
than the expected value of a new relationship. The supplier can capture the rents associated
with this di¤erence in values if cooperation with the producer continues, which induces him
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to invest more than his short-run interest would dictate. We consider this cooperative
equilibrium as a model of an economy with poor contractibility but where relational contracts
are widespread. We contrast this case with two other cases: an economy with the same poor
contractibility, but where there is no cooperation in equilibrium (we refer to it as the Nash
case") and a setting in which inputs are fully contractible.
Every period, we let one supplier (the innovator) have the possibility to develop a new
technology, which is imitated by her competitors after one period. Producers already engaged
in a long-term relationship face a trade-o¤: switching to the innovator allows them to have
access to a more productive technology, but at the risk of entering into a bad match. Entering
into a bad match yields a lower productivity level no matter whether the input is contractible or
not; but, when the input is noncontractible and when suppliers cooperate in good matches, bad
matches are also characterized by more severe under-investment than good matches. Hence,
bad matches become worse relative to good matches. This worse bad match e¤ect is the main
force behind our result that cooperation in a weak contractible setting magnies rigidities in
relationships.1 In particular, in order for an innovator to capture a large share of the market,
innovations have to be larger in the cooperative case than in the contractible or Nash cases.
This result suggests that innovations spread more slowly in countries or sectors where relational
contracts are widespread and enforcement of formal contracts di¢ cult, relative to countries or
sectors where enforcement of formal contracts is easy or where rms do not engage in relational
contracts.
The insight that cooperation cannot be established if there is no cost of switching partners
is also central to the analysis of both Kranton (1996) and Ghosh and Ray (1996), who both
study the type of equilibria that can be sustained in models without full contractibility. In
Kranton, the cost arises from the choice of an equilibrium in which cooperation is precluded for
a number of periods initially. Ghosh and Ray reject such equilibria by imposing a condition of
bilateral rationalityrequiring that two players always initiate a relationship with the highest
level of cooperation. We impose an analogous condition. The cost in Ghosh and Ray is similar
to ours and arises from a chance of matching with an impatientplayer who will under no
circumstances engage in cooperation. Both papers feature cooperation and the source of the
cost is not crucial for the possibility of establishing cooperation; an exogenous xed cost of
switching would likewise allow for cooperation.
The novel feature of the present paper is that cooperation can introduce rigid relationships
and thereby dynamic ine¢ ciencies. This result is not trivial and depends on the initial source
of switching costs. In particular, it would not follow in a model of exogenous xed cost of
1 In our baseline equilibrium the decision to switch or not is e¢ cient in the sense of maximizing joint prots
(the standard monopoly distortion is present), as a producer who switches to the innovator can resume coop-
eration with his old supplier if the innovator turned out to be a bad match, without any punishment from the
old supplier.
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switching as then the cost of breaking up an existing relationship would be independent of
the level of cooperation and relationships would not by themselves imply rigidity. In our
setting, however, the cost of switching increases with cooperation, since bad matches become
worse" as only good matches feature cooperation.
Further, we show that innovation is always lower in the cooperative than in the contractible
case and that it can be lower than in the Nash case. This suggests that innovation is reduced
in countries or sectors with poor contractual environment, and that the development of rela-
tional contracts can have negative circumstances. In an extension, we also demonstrate that
cooperation might lead the innovator to follow a riskier innovation strategy.
The last section of the paper investigates di¤erent forms of innovations. First, we relax the
assumption that the innovator is imitated after one period and let imitation happens gradually.
Then, the long-standing presence of rms with better technologies can weaken cooperation in
existing relationships, so that for some parameter values, existing relationships are in fact easier
to break in the cooperative than in the contractible or Nash cases. Finally, we study within
relationships innovations, and show that cooperation enhances them relative to the Nash case,
and may even enhances them relative to the contractible set-up. Combined with our rst set of
results, we interpret these as suggesting that cooperation in a weak contractible environment
specically deters some types of innovations: those that are general and get easily imitated
(maybe because of weak IPRs).
Our paper relates to two main topics in the literature: the possibility of building relation-
ships under imperfect contractibility and the impact of institutions, in particular contractibility,
on macroeconomic outcomes. A large body of theoretical literature addresses the question of
building relationships in the presence of contractual incompleteness: the repetition of the same
interaction can give rise to equilibria of the Folk theorem type, where parties cooperate and
provide more e¤ort (or investment) than they would in a one-shot interaction. Macaulay (1963)
is the rst paper to show that interactions between rms in most markets are repeated and
that rms are engaged in relational contracts. In the law literature, the theory of relational
contracts was rst developed by MacNeil (1974), followed in particular by Ellickson (1991) and
MacLeod (2006). Kreps (1996) argues that informal agreements can be superior to explicit
contracts when writing an explicit contract is costly.2 Dixit (2004) is closely related to our
paper as he analyzes the type of informal institutions that emerge when the judiciary system
of a country is not well developed (a famous example based on repeated interactions is Greif
(1993)s Maghribi traders). More recently, the importance of relational contracts in develop-
ing countries has been highlighted by Banerjee and Duo (2000) who show that in the Indian
software industry, reputation of rms matter for the kind of contracts they are o¤ered.3 The
2Klein (1996) shows that court enforcement and reputation mechanisms are complement in determining the
range within which contractual relationships are self-sustained.
3Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005), Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian and Qian (2006) and Allen, Chakrabarti,
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interaction between formal and informal institutions in the context of the interaction between a
rm and an employee was analyzed in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) who demonstrated that
splitting payment into a contractible wage and noncontractible bonus can increase e¢ ciency
and the resulting contract resembles existing wage contracts. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
(1994) analyze a similar setup and demonstrate that sometimes a signal better correlated to
the actual performance (which can be interpreted as a proxy for more developed institutions)
can prevent the formation of more e¢ cient implicit contracts.
Closer to our work, Board (2011) considers a simple hold-up problem where a principal
invests in a supplier for the provision of an input. There are several suppliers and investment
costs are stochastic. To prevent hold-up, a principal and a set of suppliers enter a relational
contract where the principal is biased towards the suppliers with whom she has already worked
with (the insiders). This implies that an outsider with a better technology is not systemati-
cally chosen, in line with our results. Nevertheless, our paper goes further in several dimensions.
First, we analyze how rigidities a¤ect the incentives to innovate. Second, in our set-up, co-
operation can be welfare reducing, which it never is in his paper. Third, we also emphasize
situations where the establishment of long-term relationships does not create rigidities.
Two papers provide evidence for some of the assumptions of our model. First, Brown, Falk
and Fehr (2004) ran experiments showing the endogenous emergence of long-term relationships
in the absence of third party enforcement. They showed that low e¤ort was punished by the
termination of the relationship, and that in successful relationships, e¤ort was high from the
very beginning. Our cooperative equilibrium shares these features. The paper closest in spirit
to ours is the empirical investigation of Johnson, McMillan and Woodru¤ (2002). The authors
are interested in the impact of courts e¢ ciency on the extent to which rms grant trade
credit to each other (which is viewed as a proxy for the level of trust between rms). They
use a rms survey conducted in several Eastern European countries and show that in ongoing
relationships, the belief in the e¢ ciency of the court had very little impact on the level of trade
credit, which suggests that rms engage in relational contracts. However, it matters a lot at
the beginning of a relationship and for rmsincentives to try out new suppliers. Our model
shares the same features, and may then be understood as a rationalization of their results.
There exists a large literature on the impact of institutions, particularly contractibility, on
growth and development.4 Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2007) have shown that countries
with weaker legal institutions adopt inferior technologies and develop a comparative advan-
tage in sectors where there is more substitutability across inputs. Boehm (2013) structurally
estimates the impact of weak contractibility on productivity across countries using a general
De, Qian, and Qian (2008) show in related papers that in India and China long-term relationships provide a
successful way of nancing rms.
4For instance, Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2003) show that institutions that favor the establishment of
long-term relationships between rms and managers are appropriate far from the frontier but turn out to be a
burden close to it. Bonglioli and Gancia (2014) present a similar trade-o¤.
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equilibrium model where rms face a choice between producing inputs in-house and outsourc-
ing. These papers, however, do not allow for the establishment of relational contracts. Cowan
and Neut (2007) show empirically, that productivity is relatively larger in countries with good
legal enforcement in sectors with a more complex intermediate structure, and, similarly, Nunn
(2007) show that these countries develop a comparative advantage in sectors that rely more
on relation-specic investments.5
The literature on incomplete contracts and macroeconomics includes Francois and Roberts
(2003), who study the impact of growth on contractual arrangements (some of our results
point towards feedback e¤ects where the frequency and the type of innovation a¤ect the extent
of cooperation between business partners) as well as Caballero and Hammour (1998) who
relate incomplete contracts to the amplication of macroeconomics. Finally, the related idea
that long-term relationships between producers and suppliers can be a barrier to entry was
formalized in Aghion and Bolton (1987), who show that when an incumbent faces entry by
potential competitors with superior technology, she will sign long-term contract that reduces
the risk of entry. In our set-up, however, the relationship is of a di¤erent nature as the contract
is implicit and we rule out explicit contracts that would last more than a single period.
We start out by introducing the basic model in section 2, where we describe the cooperative
equilibrium that we study. Section 3 shows that cooperation leads to rigid relationships.
Section 4 studies the e¤ect of cooperation on the rate of innovation. Section 5 presents some
extensions. Section 6 discusses di¤erent types of innovations for which cooperation may not
be as much an impediment to innovation. Section 7 concludes. The proofs of the main results
are available in Appendix A and the remaining proofs in the Online Appendix (Appendix B).
2 Model and cooperative equilibrium
In this section we develop a model of repeated interaction between nal good producers (he)
and intermediate input suppliers (she) in general equilibrium, where some producer-supplier
matches are exogenously more productive than others. We rst show that when the provision of
the input is noncontractible, the classic hold-up problem arises and suppliers have an incentive
to underinvest in an one-shot interaction. Then we introduce exogenous innovation and let
the game be repeated, and dene a cooperative equilibrium, where the prospect of continuing
the relationship in the following period provides suppliers in a good match with an incentive
to invest more than they would do in the one-shot interaction.
5 In the trade literature, Rauch (1999) shows the importance of networks in shaping trade, especially for more
di¤erentiated products.
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2.1 Preferences and production
We consider a quasi-general equilibrium model where consumers consume only two types of
nal goods: a set of di¤erentiated goods (denoted ci) of measure 1, and a homogenous outside
good (denoted Co). Aggregate preferences are given by a representative agent with utility:
U =
1X
t=0
1
(1 + )t

Co;t +

   1
Z 1
0
c
 1

jt dj

; (1)
where  denotes the discount rate of the consumers. For clarity we will drop the subscripts t
when this does not lead to confusion.
The outside good is produced at constant returns to scale one for one with labor and we
normalize its price to 1, such that the wage in the economy is also equal to 1 (we consider
parameter values such that the outside good always remains active).6 All the action in the
model takes place in the production of di¤erentiated goods. The demand for a variety j (cj)
and the quantity of variety j produced (qj), can be written as a function solely of its own
price:7
qj = cj = p
 
j : (2)
Production of the di¤erentiated good requires the joint work of two types of agents, nal
good producers and intermediary input suppliers. The production of each variety is associated
with the essential input of the nal good producer who has the monopoly right over that variety
(so there is a mass 1 of nal good producers). Final good producers die with a probability
D every period and are replaced with new ones. Moreover, every period, each nal good
producer must hire a single intermediate input supplier. There is a mass 1 of intermediate input
suppliers, who are innitely lived. We could equally well have assumed that the intermediate
good suppliers die with probability D. Each intermediate input supplier can supply any
number of nal good producers without decreasing returns to scale.
More specically, if the monopolist j hires the supplier k, the production technology is
linear in the quantity of good quality inputs provided by the supplier:
qj = (jkAk)
1
 1 X; (3)
6Of course, as growth in the di¤erentiated sector takes place, the di¤erentiated sector eventually becomes so
productive, that the consumption of the homogenous good is driven to 0. Technically, what we present here is
an approximation, which is valid only as long as the productivity of the di¤erentiated sector remains su¢ ciently
low. Alternatively, we can assume that the productivity of the homogenous good grows at the rate of the
technological frontier (through knowledge externality), in which case, what we present is not an approximation
but the exact solution. Nothing of substance depends on this.
7The functional form of the utility function allows us to avoid general equilibrium e¤ects going through the
wages (thanks to the presence of the homogenous good) or the price index (as the elasticity of substitution
between the varieties is equalized with the price elasticity of the CES aggregator). These general equilibrium
features would complicate the analysis without changing any of our central results.
6
where jk is a match specic and veriable permanent level of productivity, Ak is the pro-
ductivity of the intermediate input supplier k and X is the quantity of intermediate inputs
of good quality provided by the supplier (technically, we should refer to (jkAk)
1
 1 as the
productivity, but, throughout the paper we make the abuse of language of referring to jkAk
as productivity). Producing one good quality intermediate input requires one unit of the ho-
mogenous good, but the supplier can also produce an intermediate input of bad quality at 0
cost, which has no value in production. The match specic level of productivity jk can take
two values: jk = 1 in good matches, and jk =  < 1 in bad matches. The quality of a match
is revealed to both the supplier and the producer only once they start working together (but
before the supplier has to incur any investment) and is permanent.8 Once a match has been
chosen (and the match specic productivity determined) a period has to pass before they can
form new relationships. We denote by b the probability that a new producer/supplier pair
turns out to be a bad match. The suppliers level of productivity Ak is independent of the
producer.
Throughout the paper we normalize the amount of good quality inputs provided by the
supplier by the productivity of the relationship jkAk, and denote it x (so that x  X= (jkAk)).
We refer to x as the normalized amount of good quality input or the normalized investment level
(as bad quality inputs are produced costlessly). We can then express revenues as jkAkR (x),
where R (x) are the normalized revenues (R (x)  x 1 ), and joint prots as jkAk (x) where
 (x) are the normalized joint prots  (x)  x 1   x.
2.2 Contractual incompleteness
We model contractual incompleteness in a standard fashion (a simpler version of Grossman
and Hart, 1986): contractual incompleteness is the source of a classic hold-up problem. More
specically, an input is specic to a particular producer and is useless to any other agent in the
economy, and, once a producer has chosen to work with a supplier, he cannot nd any other
supplier that period. Therefore once the two parties have decided to start working together,
the set-up becomes one of bilateral monopoly. We briey consider the one shot interaction in
order to show the ine¢ ciencies that repeated interactions can overcome.
If the input is contractible, the court can verify whether the input provided is of good or
bad quality. The producer and the supplier sign a contract that maximize joint prots, so that
the normalized quantity of good quality inputs is at the rst best level (m) given by:
m  arg max
x
R (x)  x = ((   1) =) :
If the input is noncontractible, the court cannot verify whether the input provided is of good
8As explained in section 3.3, this is not a crucial assumption: the logic of our results would carry through if
the type of a match was only revealed after the rst investment has occurred.
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or bad quality.9 There is a standard double hold-up problem: as contracts are unenforceable
the stipulations of a given contract are irrelevant and the producer can claim that the inputs are
of bad quality and refuse to pay, while a supplier can costlessly deliver low quality inputs (since
the producer cannot nd a new supplier at that point). Therefore, any contract specifying the
amount of inputs of good quality to be provided is worthless. We make the classic assumption
that the revenues are then shared through ex-post Nash Bargaining, and we denote by  2 (0; 1)
the bargaining power of the supplier. Therefore, providing the rst best normalized amount
of investment m is no longer in the interest of the supplier, as she bears the full cost of the
investment but is only paid a share  of the revenues. Instead the supplier chooses to provide
the amount of good quality input that maximize her ex-post prots and provides the Nash
normalized level of investment n, given by:
n  arg max
x
R (x)  x = m:
As in any standard model, there is underinvestment: n < m.10
Before the producer and the supplier start working together, an ex-ante cash transfer
can be exchanged. If all suppliers are identical (Ak  1 for all k), they will break-even:
therefore, in the contractible case, the ex-ante transfer from the supplier to the producer
is equal to t = (1  b+ b) (R (m) m), and in the noncontractible setting it is equal to
t = (1  b+ b) (R (n)  n).
2.3 Innovation
We focus on Schumpeterianinnovations where rms can improve the quality of their products
to capture larger market shares (see Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt, 2015, for the relevance
of Schumpeterian growth theory). We study within relationship innovations where a rm
cooperate with its clients to improve the quality of the nal product in section 6.2. For the
moment, we take the innovation decision as given and assume that an innovation happens with
probability I 2 (0; 1). As a main argument of the paper is that long-term relationships can
reduce innovations, we endogenize the rate in section 4. When innovation occurs one of the
suppliers gets access to a technology  > 1 times more productive than the previous frontier
9We take contract incompleteness as a fact and do not model the informational assumption for this in-
completeness to exist. We make the classic assumption that revenues and expenditures of the parties are non
veriable and therefore cannot be part of a contract. As argued in Malcomson (2011) and demonstrated more
generally in Evans (2008) variable delivery can often reestablish e¢ ciency: if the parties agree on a price from
producer to supplier of R(m) but give the producer the right to refuse acceptance, both delivery of m by
supplier and payment by producer are individually optimal in a one-shot game and e¢ cency can be restored.
Although these issues are interesting the focus here is on the ability of relationships to restore e¢ ciency, and
we sidestep them by assuming that any delivery is unveriable as well.
10Underinvestment not only decreases prots but further reduces welfare: in the full contractibility case, the
monopoly distortion already leads to a production of di¤erentiated goods lower than the welfare maximizing
level, incomplete contractibility aggravates this initial monopoly distortion.
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technology, but, after a single period all suppliers have access to the new technology. This
assumption simplies the problem and may reect a situation with poor intellectual property
rights (IPRs). Section 6.1 relaxes it and solves for the case where the innovator is progressively
imitated. We denote by A the current frontier level of technology, so that, in periods without
innovation all suppliers use technology A, and, in periods with innovation only the innovator
uses the frontier technology while the other suppliers use  1A.
2.4 Timeline
The overall timeline within each period is as follows
1. Final good producers die with probability D and a mass D of new nal good producers
are born.
2. Innovation occurs with probability I . If innovation occurs one supplier has access to a
technology  > 1 times more productive.
3. Each supplier makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of an ex-ante transfer t to each producer.
In the contractible case, she also commits to an amount of good quality input conditioned
on the quality of the match.
4. Each producer chooses his supplier and the transfer t from the supplier to the producer
is paid.
5. The type of the match is revealed if the two parties are interacting for the rst time (it
is already known otherwise).
6. The supplier decides on how much good quality input to provide in the noncontractible
case.
7. Revenues are shared between the producer and the supplier through ex post Nash bar-
gaining where the supplier has a weight of .
Note that every stage game has three moves: in phase 3 suppliers make their o¤ers for the
ex-ante transfer, in phase 4 producers choose a supplier, and in phase 6 suppliers undertake
the investment. The assumption of suppliers making take it or leave it o¤ers to producers
when deciding on the ex-ante transfer (Bertrand competition) simplies matters, but is not
necessary. We could extend the model to include ex ante Nash bargaining over surplus and allow
producers to pay a (noncontractible) bonus to the supplier if she cooperates without a¤ecting
the incentive constraints in the following. A similar result is demonstrated in MacLeod and
Malcomson (1989) (part 3 of Proposition 1) and we leave out a formal proof here.
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2.5 Building a cooperative equilibrium
In the following we will consider three di¤erent setups: a situation where the input is fully
contractible and the rst best level of investment can be achieved even in a one-shot interaction
(we refer to this as the contractible case), a case where the quality and delivery of the input
is noncontractible and we allow for cooperation as described below (the cooperative case), and
nally a case where the quality and delivery of the input is noncontractible and we preclude
any form of cooperation (i.e. actions in one period cannot be conditioned on actions in previous
periods, we call this the Nash case). It is important to be clear about the relations between
these cases. Whereas the cooperative and Nash cases are two di¤erent equilibria in the same
environment of noncontractibility, the contractible case is derived under di¤erent environmental
assumptions. In principle agents could switch between cooperate and Nash equilibria. The
comparison between the cooperative and contractible cases is still interesting because it makes
clear that even though cooperation can increase investment to the rst best it still does not
achieve the same welfare as full contractibility.
We stress that the contractible environment is still a world of limited contractibility: we do
not allow for contracts across periods or between more than two parties. Instead contractible
refers here solely to the provision of the input. Therefore the equilibrium in the contractible
case need not achieve the overall rst best, but the investment level is always at the rst best
level m (for every history of the game). In this setting, a new born producer switches suppliers
until he nds a good match. Once he has found one, he sticks to her in periods without
innovation, and, because of Bertrand competition, the good match supplier o¤ers an ex-ante
transfer that allows her to capture the entire surplus of the ongoing relationship over any new
relationship. In periods with innovation the producer optimally decides whether he should
switch to the innovator (we study this in section 3.1). If the innovator turns out to be a bad
match, the producer resumes working with his previous good match supplier in the following
period. When we preclude cooperation (the Nash case) the same equilibrium exists but with
input investment of n instead of the rst best.
We now turn to the characterization of equilibria where the input is noncontractible and we
allow for cooperation. As is typically the case in models of this type, there is a continuum of
SPNEs featuring some level of cooperation between a producer and a supplier (that is equilibria
where investment is higher than in the one shot interaction), and we restrict attention to a
particular class of equilibria as described in the following.
We denote by Hnt (j; k) the set of histories of the game after t repetitions just after phase
5 has occurred (just after the type has been revealed) when producer j and supplier k are
matched for the rst time and supplier k has turned out to be a good match. We impose a
symmetry and information condition:
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Condition 1 Symmetry and Information (SI) i) For any history belonging to [
k
Hnt (j; k)
where the supplier k has access to the frontier technology, the path of normalized investment
undertaken in the following histories by the new supplier k are the same, and the decision of
the producer to continue the relationship with the supplier k or not is the same; similarly for
any history belonging to [
k
Hnt (j; k) where the supplier k does not have access to the frontier
technology; ii) the strategies played with one producer are independent of the history of the game
played with other producers; iii) if a supplier has been chosen by the producer, her normalized
investment is independent of the ex-ante transfer paid by the supplier;
Part i) is a symmetry condition. Provided that the supplier has access to the frontier
technology, every new good match relationship is identical in terms of the level of normalized
investment and of the producerdecision to retain the supplier or not (both on and o¤ the
equilibrium path). In particular, if a producer starts a relationship with the innovator and
the innovator turns out to be a good match, the outcome is symmetric to the case where
the producer started his rst relationship. We cannot however require that the strategies are
identical, because, in general, the ex-ante transfer exchanged depend on whether the producer
knows a good match supplier or not. This condition rules out equilibria where there is never
cooperation with the innovator even if she is a good match.11 Part ii) allows us to keep the
strategies with other producers independent, so, for instance, producers cannot coordinate on
punishing a supplier. Part iii) is necessary to ensure that the supplier gets the full value of the
relationship when the rst best is achieved. Otherwise it is possible to build equilibria where
part of the surplus of a relationship would go to the producer, despite Bertrand competition.
It should be clear that conditions i) and ii) avoid equilibria where players could coordinate
their actions on histories that should have no direct impact on their interactions. Such re-
strictions would necessarily operate in an alternative environment where we directly restricted
the information available to the players. Condition iii) does not a¤ect any of our results but
simplies the exposition.
Consider a situation in which a new innovation takes place and a producer decides to break-
up an existing relationship and try out the new supplier. Should the supplier consider this a
deviation and punish the producer if he comes back? This matters both for the decision of
whether to come back and for the division of prots in the new relationship. In the main section
of the paper we impose a forgiveness conditionand allow the resumption of cooperation.
Condition 2 Forgiveness. The strategy played by a good match supplier at time t, is the
same when the producer has worked with the supplier at time t  1 and when the producer has
worked with an innovator but the innovator turned out to be a bad match.
11Without this condition it would be possible to build equilibria where the path of investment levels will be
systematically lower with new supplier than with the rst supplier.
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As we will discuss later, this condition ensures that the decision of whether to switch or
not is jointly e¢ cient. We consider the opposite assumption where a supplier systematically
punishes a producer if he switches supplier, no matter what happens with the new supplier
in subsection 5.1 and demonstrate that under quite general conditions the qualitative results
are the same and that the inability to revert back adds an additional source of rigidity from
cooperation.
In every period, the producer has to choose between continuing a relationship or switching
to a new supplier. The di¢ culties of generating cooperation when players can switch partners
at will is well known: If partners can costlessly start new relationships, the threat of retaliation
from the current partner does not carry any force and the cost from not cooperating is non-
existing. This is the interest of Kranton (1996) and Ghosh and Ray (1996). Kranton (1996)
demonstrates that in a setting with identical agents and costless switching between partners
any equilibrium featuring more cooperation than a one shot interaction cannot be pair-wise
enforceable: any equilibrium with cooperation requires some initial cost of a new relationship
from lower initial cooperation, but when two new partners rst meet they could credibly agree
to skip the initial low level of cooperation and the equilibrium unravels. Both Ghosh and
Ray (1996) and Kranton (1996) build equilibria that overcome this by introducing impatient
players who will never cooperate. The existence of such players serve as an expected cost
of establishing a new relationship and enables cooperation. The presence of good and bad
matches in the current setup is analogous and following the language of Ghosh and Ray (1996)
we impose a bilateral rationalitycondition. Denoting respectively by V p;j () and V s;k ()
the values of producer j and supplier k, when the prole of strategy is , we dene the bilateral
rationality condition as follows.
Condition 3 Bilateral rationality. At any history ht 2 Hnt (j; k) ; jht is such that there
is no 0 =

0j jht; 0kjht;  kjht

(where  k denotes the prole of the other suppliers) where
0j jh0t = j jh0j for all histories h0t 2 Hnt (j; k0) (k 6= k0), 0 satises condition 2, and neither
player j nor player k have an incentive to deviate from 0, such that V p;j (0) + V s;k (0) >
V p;j () + V s;k () :
The bilateral rationalitymeans that a new pair chooses strategies that maximize their
joint value under the condition that the strategy of the producer with a new good match is
given (the producer is expected to renegotiate his strategies once he has found a new good
match), strategies are enforceable (neither the producer nor the supplier have an incentive to
deviate), and the forgiveness condition is not violated. This condition rules out collusive
behavior by suppliers: in a good match, suppliers are willing to cooperate as much as possible
right away.12 This condition should not be confused with a renegotiation-proofcondition. If
12 In general the strategies that maximize the joint values may let cooperation resume at a lower level if the
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one of the players deviates from the prescribed strategies a punishment phase is allowed even
if it yields lower prots. Finally, we impose:
Condition 4 No investment in bad matches. Normalized investment levels in bad matches
are given by the Nash investment level, n.
One could imagine cooperation in some bad match relationships, although an equilibrium
with symmetric cooperation in all bad matches is impossible as there would be no punishment
for deviation. For some parameter values, however, a mixed strategy equilibrium is possible.
Allowing for such would alter little in our general analysis, but would complicate both ex-
position and notation. We therefore restrict attention to the only pure strategy symmetric
equilibrium, which requires no investment in bad matches. This condition can be seen as an
additional symmetry condition. If the productivity level  is su¢ ciently low, this condition
is automatically met as a producer would continue to search for a new supplier regardless of
whether cooperation in bad matches is possible or not. We demonstrate the following propo-
sition (the proof is contained in Appendices A and B.1).
Proposition 1 a) There exists a symmetric SPNE satisfying conditions 1-4 b) In any sym-
metric SPNE satisfying conditions 1-4, there are two constants x; y 2 (n;m] such that nor-
malized investment in good matches is x when the supplier uses the frontier technology and
y otherwise.
Further, as shown in Appendix B.1, any symmetric SPNE satisfying conditions 1-4 has the
following structure: A newborn producer switches suppliers until he nds a good match. Once
he has found a good match, he sticks to her in periods without innovation (and investment level
is at x); in periods with innovation, he optimally decides between switching to the innovator
or staying with the old good match (who now invest y). This decision depends on parameters
and is the subject of the next section. If he switches and the innovator turns out to be a good
match, he behaves with this supplier as he did with the previous good match supplier, but if
the match turns out to be bad he will revert to the previous supplier and resume cooperation
(allowed for by the forgiveness condition). Ex-ante transfers and Bertrand competition ensure
that the supplier who o¤ers the relationship of highest value captures the surplus of that
relationship over any other relationship for the producer.
The exact structure of the equilibrium depends on parameters. We now analyze how
cooperation arises in the equilibrium, and, without loss of generality, we focus on the case
producer switches to the innovator and the innovator turned out to be a bad match. On one hand, if the supplier
punishes a producer, she loses the possibility to keep working at a high level with the producer if the innovator
turns out to be bad. On the other hand, if the supplier were to reduce cooperation in case of a switch, she may
prevent the switch from happening, which can increase the incentive to cooperate in the rst place. This section
and subsection 5.1, therefore cover the two extreme cases.
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where after a deviation in a good match the producer looks for a di¤erent supplier (instead
of staying with a good match supplier playing the Nash level of investment, which is the
alternative).
When the supplier makes her investment decision, the ex-ante transfer is already paid.
However, she has yet to receive the ex-post prots from the investment: a share  of the
revenues minus the cost. Therefore, the supplier has a short run incentive to deviate from
investing an amount x, by investing the Nash level n, which maximizes her ex post prots.
Her gain for this period would then be given by ' (x)Ak, where Ak is the technology used by
the supplier, with:
' (x)  (R (n)  n)  (R (x)  x) : (4)
There is, however, a long run cost from deviating. If the supplier deviates from the equilibrium
investment level, the producer will switch supplier in the next period, so the continuation value
is 0.
If the supplier does not deviate, her continuation value is positive. If there is no innovation
in the following period, the producer continues working with the supplier and captures a value
V s1 At+1 (where At+1 is the frontier technology in the following period), which corresponds to
the surplus of a relationship with a good match supplier (of total value V T1 At+1) over starting a
new relationship (of total expected value V T0 At+1). We denote the value of the old supplier if an
innovation occurs by W s1At+1. When the producer does not switch to the innovator W
s
1At+1 is
the surplus of a relationship with an outdated good match supplier of value W T1 At+1, over the
expected value of a new relationship with the innovator V T0 At+1, when the producer switches
to the innovator, the expected value of the old supplier is still positive, because if the innovator
turns out to be a bad match the producer will revert and resume their cooperation.
In equilibrium where suppliers play x and y, the incentive constraint of the supplier in a
period without innovation is therefore:
' (x)  1  
D
1 + 
  
1  IV s1 + IW s1  ; (5)
as in the next period the frontier technology will be the same as the current technology of the
supplier if there is no innovation and will be  times higher otherwise. Similarly in a period
with innovation, the incentive constraint of an outdated good match supplier can be written
as:
 1' (y)  1  
D
1 + 
  
1  IV s1 + IW s1  ; (6)
as the technology used by the supplier is currently  times less productive than the frontier
technology.
In an equilibrium where cooperation is as high as possible, investment levels maximize joint
prots under these incentive constraints. V s1 and W
s
1 themselves depend on the equilibrium
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levels of investment in good matches x, y, such that x and y are a solution to a xed point
problem. In subsection 3.2, we derive the xed point problem and some properties of x and
y (the expressions can also be found in Appendix A.1).
Overall, in this equilibrium, the incumbent supplier has the advantage that the nature
of the match has been revealed. The advantage from the realization of being a good match
acts as a xed cost that pushes the producer to stick to the same supplier, and allows the
supplier to capture the associated rents. It is the prospect of capturing these rents that induce
cooperation in the rst place. Crucially, this xed cost interacts naturally with the incomplete
contractibility: in a situation with incomplete contractibility, there is no cooperation in bad
matches, as bad matches have no prospect. Hence bad matches are even worserelatively to
good matches in the cooperative case than in the contractibility or the no cooperation (Nash)
cases.
3 Cooperation and rigidity of relationships
In the previous section, we derived an equilibrium where cooperation in long term relationships
mitigates the under-investment problem associated with contractual incompleteness. We now
turn to a potential downside of this, namely that cooperation makes relationships more rigid.
In the rst subsection, we analyze whether a producer in a good relationship would be willing or
not to switch to an innovator, and establish that cooperation makes it harder for an innovator
to break into the market. In the second subsection, we derive how the level of cooperation
depends on parameters and in particular how it depends on innovation itself. In the third
subsection we discuss alternative set-ups and the generality of our results.
3.1 To switch or not to switch
When an innovator comes in with a superior technology, producers who have not already found
a good match necessarily try the innovator since she has the same probability of being a bad
match as any other supplier, but a better technology. Let us then focus on a producer who
knows a good match supplier and therefore faces a trade-o¤. On the one hand, staying with
his current good match delivers the certainty of being in a good match. On the other hand,
switching gives access to the innovators better technology, but at the risk of engaging in a bad
match.
We rst consider the contractible case. The technological advantage of the innovator lasts
for only one period and, if the innovator turns out to be a bad match, the producer can revert to
his old supplier (who remains a good match). Therefore, the producer switches to the innovator
if and only if the expected productivity of the innovator is higher than the productivity of an
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outdated good match, that is, if and only if:
1  b+ b >  1, or equivalently,  > con  (1  b+ b) 1 : (7)
With probability (1  b) the innovator is a good match, with probability b he is a bad match,
but the technology of the old good match supplier is  times less productive. The Nash case is
exactly identical except that normalized investment are always at the Nash level n, so that a
producer previously in a good match switches to the innovator if and only if  > Nash = con.
We now turn to the cooperative equilibrium built before. Because of Bertrand competition,
a producer previously in a good match relationship switches to the innovator, if and only if
the expected value of joint prots with the innovator is higher than with the old supplier. As
the old supplier imitates the innovators technology after one period, and as the producer can
resume cooperation with the old supplier without any cost if the innovator turns out to be a
bad match (as stipulated by the forgiveness condition"), the decision to switch depends only
on the di¤erence in expected prots in the rst period. The innovator is a good match with
probability (1  b), in which case she invests x, and a bad match with probability b, in which
case she invests n, while the old good match supplier invests y and her technology is  times
less productive, therefore we obtain (formal proof in Appendix A.1):
Lemma 1 Producers previously in a good match switch to the innovator if and only if
(1  b)  (x) + b (n) >  1 (y) : (8)
We can rewrite (8) as:
1  b+ b ( (n) = (x)) >  1 ( (y) = (x)) : (9)
Cooperation occurs in good matches so x > n, moreover, as explained below, y  x,
therefore  (n) = (x) < 1 and,  (y) = (x)  1, so that (7) is more easily satised than
(9), which gives us:
Proposition 2 (i) The parameter set for which innovators capture the whole market in the
cooperative case is strictly smaller than the parameter set for which innovators capture the whole
market in the contractible or the Nash cases. (ii) In particular, the minimum technological leap
required for an innovator to capture the whole market in the cooperative case (coop) is higher
than that in the contractible or Nash cases: coop > con = Nash.
Proposition 2 delivers the rst important message of the paper: in a context of weak
contractibility, cooperation makes it more di¢ cult to break up existing relationships. Because
of the existence of bad matches, for  su¢ ciently close to 1, innovations are not adopted by
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suppliers in good matches, but the threshold for adoption is higher in the cooperative case
than in the contractible or Nash cases.
The intuition behind this result arises from two e¤ects. The rst e¤ect is a worse bad
matches e¤ect : a bad match is more costly relative to a good match in the cooperative case. In
this case, bad matches not only involve an inherently lower productivity level, they also involve
less investment as both parties realize that the relationship will come to an end in the following
period. This is captured by the term  (n) = (x) in (9).13 This reects that switching to the
innovator is a more risky activity when the producer is engaged in a relationship.
The second e¤ect is an encouragement e¤ect, namely the fact that cooperation is (weakly)
higher when using the outdated technology, than it is when using the frontier technology (that
is, y  x, which a¤ects the decision to switch or not through the term  (y) = (x) in
(9)). The reason is that the incentive to deviate in a good match, is scaled by the technology
currently used by the supplier, which is higher with the innovator than with the old supplier,
whereas the reward from cooperation is scaled by the technology available in the next period
which is the same for the innovator and the old supplier since imitation occurs after one
period (as emphasized by (5) and (6)). In other words, the opportunity to imitate the frontier
technology in the following period encourages outdated suppliers to provide a larger e¤ort,
partly compensating the fact that they are using an outdated technology. This encouragement
e¤ect is very strong here as imitation occurs after only one period, but some form of this e¤ect
will always be present as long as the supplier has a positive probability to eventually get access
to the frontier technology (see also section 6.1).
So far, however, there is no welfare cost of cooperation and welfare in the cooperative
equilibrium is necessarily higher than in the Nash case.14 More rigid relationships will have
a negative impact on welfare only when the rate of innovation itself is endogenized in section
4. Nevertheless, Proposition 2 (ii) states that innovation would be immediately adopted by all
rms when  2 (con; coop) in the contractible and Nash cases but not the cooperative case,
so that we get:
Corollary 1 When innovation  2 (con; coop), there is more technological di¤erences across
rms in the cooperative case than in the contractible or Nash cases.
Moreover, note that coop depends on the rate of innovation I through (x; y), but because
13Recall that for  su¢ ciently small, cooperation in bad matches is necessarily impossible. For  not small
enough, the fact that there is no cooperation in bad matches comes from the condition on the equilibrium.
However, even if a pair were to deviate and start cooperating, the level of normalized investment would be
lower than in good matches, and so even this cooperativebad match would be relatively worse, than in the
contractible or Nash cases.
14From a welfare point of view at given rate of innovation, producers switch to the innovator too much. Bad
matches are even more detrimental to welfare than to prots, as nal good producers are monopolists (the level
of normalized investment that maximizes welfare is higher than m), and switching to the innovator inevitably
involves more bad matches.
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con does not, Proposition 2 (ii) will remain true with endogenous innovation and di¤erent rates
of innovation for the cooperative, Nash and contractible cases. Therefore, the previous corollary
predicts that rms are less likely to adapt innovations in countries with poor contractibility
institutions and high level of cooperation/trust than in countries with good institutions or
poor institutions but very low level of cooperation/trust.
3.2 Determining the level of cooperation
We now describe in detail the cooperative equilibrium when, after a deviation, a producer
would always rather try a new supplier than keep working with the supplier with whom the
deviation occurred (that supplier would invest the Nash level n). In Appendix A.1, we derive
that the right hand side of both incentive constraints (5) and (6) is given by:
1  D
1 + 
  
1  IV s1 + IW s1  (10)
=
1  D
1 +   b (1  D) I
0@  1  I b((1+ b(1 D)I)((x) (n))+b(1 D)I((y) (n)))1+ b(1 D)(1 I+I)
+I

1
 (y
)  ((1  b)  (x) + b (n))
+
1A ;
where X+  max (X; 0). The rst term comes from the di¤erence between the value of an
ongoing relationship and the value of starting a new relationship in a period without innova-
tion (this term is proportional to V s1 , the value of a good match supplier in a period without
innovation). This di¤erence is a weighted sum between the di¤erence in prots between a
good match and bad match in periods without innovation ( (x)    (n)) and in periods
with innovation ( 1 ( (y)   (n))). The factor b in front of the fraction reects that
a new supplier is a bad match with probability b. In periods with innovation, the di¤er-
ence between the prots with the old supplier and the prots with the innovator is given by
1
 (y
)  ((1  b)  (x) + b (n)). If this di¤erence is positive, it contributes to the value of
the old supplier, hence the second term. Comparative statics are then given by the following
proposition and remark (proofs in Appendix B.2).
Proposition 3 (i) The investment levels (x; y) weakly increase with the number of bad
matches, b, and decrease with the relative productivity of bad matches, , the discount rate,
, and the probability of death D; (ii) when the innovator captures the entire market, the
investment levels (x; y) increase in the size of innovations .
Remark 1 When a producer would always rather try a new supplier than work with a nonco-
operative good match supplier, and the innovator captures the entire market, the investment
levels (x; y) decrease with the rate of innovation I provided that innovations are not too
large (b
 
1  D  2  I < 1 +  is a su¢ cient condition).
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Proof. Online Appendix.
How much suppliers cooperate depends on how bad the alternative option is. Therefore
if the probability of a bad match, b is higher, or if they are more severe (low ), a good
relationship will have more value, and the potential for cooperation is higher. A higher value
of the future (lower  and D) have the same e¤ect. This follows directly from (10) in the
specic case where a producer does not work again with a good match supplier who has
stopped cooperating. Furthermore, we get that when the innovator captures the entire market
( > coop) large innovations favor cooperation. The reason is that larger innovations lead to a
higher growth rate, which increases the expected value a supplier can capture by cooperating,
favoring more investment in good matches. If the innovator does not capture the entire market
then larger innovations also reduce the value a good match supplier can capture in periods
with innovation.
Finally the e¤ect of the rate of innovation is in general ambiguous, even when the innovator
captures the entire market. More frequent innovations will have three e¤ects on investment
levels: (i) a positive e¤ect through a higher growth rate, (ii) a negative e¤ect through a higher
probability of ending the relationship, and (iii) a further negative e¤ect which reects that the
benet of being in a good match over a random match is higher in periods without innovation
(and this benet is precisely what drives the incentive to cooperate). For su¢ ciently small
innovations, e¤ect (ii) dominates e¤ect (i), and therefore more frequent innovations will lower
the level of cooperation. We can compare this result to Francois and Roberts (2003), who
show that an increase in innovation can push rms towards providing short-term contract
arrangements instead of implicit guarantees of lifetime employment to their workers. In our
model, the same idea is captured by the possible decrease in cooperation following an increase
in the rate of innovation.
3.3 Alternative set-ups
We now analyze the generality of Proposition 2 by discussing alternative setups under the
maintained assumption that the technological advantage of the innovator is short-lived (see
subsection 6.1 for the alternative case). What drives our result is the fact that switching to
the innovator becomes less attractive in the cooperative equilibrium. If the supplier turns out
to be a bad match not only is productivity lower, but so is cooperation as well and switching
to an innovator therefore becomes more risky. This is consistent with the ndings of Johnson
et al. (2002) that the belief in the e¢ ciency of the court matters for the level of trust between
rms at the beginning of a new relationship, but much less later.
This would be the case in a wide range of models. To generate cooperation in an equilib-
rium where parties can change partners at will, there must be a cost of switching from one
partner to another (here, the risk of nding a bad match). In many set-ups this cost interacts
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with incomplete contractibility to generate a lower level of cooperation at the beginning of a
relationship. This would also be the case if we had assumed that the type of a match was only
revealed after the rst investment has occurred, since then cooperation in the rst period of
a relationship would lie between the Nash level and the level in a match which is known to
be good. Similarly, in models where suppliers di¤er in their discount rate, or in models with
relationship-specic human capital, the (expected) level of cooperation in a new relationship
will be lower than in an established one. In fact, a low level of cooperation at the beginning
of a relationship itself can be the source of the xed cost as in the rst model of Kranton
(1996), but such equilibrium relies on some collusive behavior by the suppliers which we ruled
out with the bilateral rationality condition.
Nevertheless, the result that cooperation creates rigidities is not straightforward. Consider
an alternative set-up without good and bad matches but where there is a xed cost of switching
suppliers fA. Then, provided that the xed cost is su¢ ciently large, the rst best investment
level can be achieved in the cooperative equilibrium and the producer switches to the innovator
as soon as (   1)  (m)  f in both the contractible and cooperative cases, but he switches if
(   1)  (n)  f in the Nash case, that is for higher innovation sizes . There (and in contrast
with our set-up), the relative cost of switching does not increase with cooperation.
Finally, even in the current set-up, could society do better? The answer is yes, but only
with collusion by suppliers. To see this, consider a model without innovation. One can build
an equilibrium where cooperation occurs only when the producer meets a good match for the
rst time, and where there is no cooperation should a deviation occur and the producer nds a
new good match. Then, the value of the rst good match relationship over a new relationship
is higher since there is never going to be cooperation again and therefore cooperation (on
path) is higher. However, this requires that a new good match supplier punishes a producer for
a deviation that occurred with the rst good match supplier. Similarly, if outdated suppliers
agree not to cooperate with potential producers in periods where innovation occurs, they can
push producers to try out the innovator in the rst period, and relationships end up being
even less rigid than in the contractible case. Nevertheless, this does not t the description of a
competitive industry, and is di¢ cult to generalize in a set-up with imperfect information (for
instance if suppliers do not know whether a producer knows a good match or not, whether an
innovation has occurred or not).
4 Endogenous innovation
Subsection 3.1 showed that cooperation creates rigidity in long-term relationships. We now
turn to the issue of how this rigidity can be the source of dynamic ine¢ ciencies. We study
how the equilibrium rate of innovation I is determined and show that the rate of innovation
is reduced with noncontractibility, and may be further reduced by cooperation.
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4.1 Rate of innovation
We now model the innovation e¤ort. The crucial element of interest is the value of a new
innovation which depends on whether the input is contractible or not, and if not, on whether
cooperation occurs or not. The higher is the value the higher is the incentive to invest. We
choose a particular simple setting to demonstrate this, but it should be clear that our results
hold more generally.
Every period one supplier gets a new idea. This idea turns into a useful innovation with
probability I if the potential innovator invests A 
 
I

(where A is the frontier technological
level before innovation occurs), and  is a convex function with  (0) = 0,  0 (0) = 0 and
lim
I!1
 0
 
I

= 1. The size of innovation  is a constant. Because the probability that the
potential innovator has already made a successful innovation is innitesimal, the market share
of the potential innovator is innitesimal, so that, for all purposes the potential innovator is
an entrant. In this subsection, we compare the rate of innovation in the three di¤erent cases:
contractible, Nash and cooperative.
Thanks to Bertrand competition the innovator captures the entire value of a relationship
with her over the second best option of the producer.15 Recall that the technological advantage
of the innovator lasts for only one period, and that, in the cooperative case, good match
suppliers resume cooperation if the producer switches to the innovator and the innovator turns
out to be a bad match. The di¤erence between the value of a relationship with the innovator
and the value of a relationship with the best alternative, is then simply equal to the di¤erence in
prots in the rst period. We denote by V s;tI;K the value captured by the innovator (normalized
by the frontier productivity level) from a relationship with a producer, who knows a good
match supplier (t = g), or who does not know any good match supplier (t = b), for the
contractible (K = con), the Nash (K = Nash) and the cooperative cases (K = coop). We get
that, in the contractible case, the value captured by the innovator from a relationship with a
producer previously not in a good match is given by:
V s;bI;con = (1  b+ b)
 
1   1 (m) ; (11)
while the value captured by the innovator from a relationship with a producer previously in a
good match is given by:
V s;gI;con =
 
1  b+ b    1+  (m) : (12)
The situation of producers previously in a good match has been analyzed in (7). The reasoning
is similar for the other producers: joint expected prots are same with the innovator and any
other supplier except in the rst period where they are  times higher with the innovator; and
15 If instead of Bertrand competition, we had assumed ex-ante Nash Bargaining, the innovator would capture
only part of the di¤erence, but as long as he captures a postive part, the results of this subsection carry through.
21
Bertrand competition allows the innovator to capture all the surplus of a relationship with her
over any other relationship. Similarly, for the Nash case, we get:
V s;bI;Nash = (1  b+ b)
 
1   1 (n) and V s;gI;Nash =  1  b+ b    1+  (n) : (13)
Finally, in the cooperative case, we get:
V s;bI;coop = (1  b)
 
 (x)   1 (y)+ b  1   1 (n) ; (14)
V s;gI;coop =
 
(1  b)  (x) + b (n)   1 (y)+ : (15)
The case of producers previously in good matches was analyzed in (8). The case of producers
previously not in good matches follows the same logic. The innovator captures the di¤erence in
expected prots between a relationship with her and starting a relationship with an outdated
supplier. If the producer were to do so, expected joint prots would be the same except in the
rst period where the outdated supplier would be  times less productive, and would invest y
instead of x if she were a good match.
In equilibrium, the steady-state fraction of rms previously not in a good match is con-
stant, independent of the rate of innovation and given by ! = D=
 
1   1  D b.16 Hence,
assuming that the steady state has been reached, the innovator solves the problem:
maxb b
h
!V s;bI;K
 
I

+ (1  !)V s;gI;K
 
I
i   b ; (16)
for K = C; Nash; NC. The rst order condition uniquely denes the equilibrium rate of
innovation in the contractible case (con), and in the Nash case (Nash). In the cooperative
case, the value of the innovator depends on the equilibrium rate of innovation, so any xed
point of the rst order condition would be a solution to the problem, we consider the highest
one and denote it coop.17 A higher expected reward from innovation leads to a higher rate of
innovation. First, note that for certain parameter values, ie.  2 (con; coop),18 an innovation
is only su¢ ciently protable to justify switching for the contractible and Nash cases, but not for
the cooperative case, that is V s;gI;coop = 0 and V
s;g
I;Nash; V
s;g
I;con > 0. More generally, applying that
m  y  x > n, to equations (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15), we easily get V s;gI;con > V s;gI;coop,
V s;bI;con > V
s;b
I;coop and that V
s;g
I;coop can be higher or lower than V
s;g
I;Nash.
19 This gives the following
proposition.
16! is the share of rms that know a good match supplier willing to cooperate with them. It does not depend
on the rate of innovation, because when an innovation occurs, producers do not lose the possibility to cooperate
with their old supplier.
17We could also assume that  is su¢ ciently convex to rule out the possibility of multiple equilibra.
18Note, that although we denote by coop the size of innovation necessary for switching in the cooperative
case in both this section and the preceding, they are mathematically di¤erent objects. In the preceding section,
the rate of innovation, I was exogenous and coop was a function of I . In this section, I is a choice variable
so coop is no longer a function of I . Not making this explicit in the text should not lead to confusion.
19One can prove that V s;bI;coop > V
s;b
I;Nash: the value captured by the innovator from producers who are not in
an ongoing relationship is higher in the cooperative case than in the Nash case.
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Proposition 4 The highest equilibrium rate of innovation in the cooperative case is lower
than the rate of innovation in the contractible case, and may even be lower than the rate of
innovation in the Nash case: coop; Nash < con but coop 7 Nash.
The crucial element of Proposition 4 is the comparison between the value of innovating
in the cooperative and Nash cases. This is the result of three e¤ects. The worse bad match
e¤ect reduces the expected gain from innovation as the lower productivity of a bad match
will be further increased by the lack of cooperation and the encouragement e¤ect induces more
cooperation from the existing supplier which reduces the gain from switching. As the innovator
must compensate the producer for this, the potential reward to the innovator is reduced. In
addition to these two e¤ects, there is an additional opposite scale e¤ect : a higher level of
cooperation with frontier good matches increases protability should the innovator turn out
to be a good match which increases the incentive to innovate. This explains why coop may be
higher or lower than Nash. Comparing the contractible case to the cooperative one, all e¤ects
go in the same direction which is why coop < con.
Interestingly, if  2 (con; coop), relationships never break up in the cooperative case
(unless the producer dies) but do so in the contractible case. If  > coop, innovations break
up relationships in both cases, but as innovations are more frequent in the contractible case,
relationships still last longer in the cooperative case. Therefore the model predicts that as long
as cooperation occurs, relationships should last longer in countries where contracts are poorly
enforced.
As innovation is already too low from a welfare perspective because of standardexternal-
ities of imitation and building on the shoulders of giant, a lower rate of innovation can easily
translate into lower welfare, so that we get:
Corollary 2 Welfare is always lower with incomplete contractibility than with complete con-
tractibility, and cooperation may increase or decrease welfare.
In other words, if cooperation decreases the rate of innovation relative to the Nash case,
it is possible that this lower rate of innovation leads to lower welfare, despite the higher level
of investment in relationships. The fact that the rate of innovation is ine¢ cient to start with
is essential to get this result. Relationships make the protability of a new innovation smaller
for the innovator, but that loss in itself cannot outweigh the benet of higher investment that
comes from the relationship. It is only because innovation is already too low (such that a
further reduction lowers welfare for society as a whole) that relationships can decrease overall
welfare.
Consider alternatively a setup in which an innovation is temporary such that the innovator
returns to the old technology after one period and no imitation is possible (such that both
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imitation and building on the shoulders of giants has been precluded).20 In such a case,
private and social benets of an innovation are equal. All of our results except corollary
2 would still hold.
5 Extensions
Here we present some extensions of the baseline set-up. First, we consider an alternative
cooperative equilibrium where the supplier punishes the producer (by refusing to engage in
future cooperation) if he switches to the innovator no matter what type the innovator turns
out to be. Then, we discuss how our results depend on the distance to the technological
frontier, before turning to a case where the supplier can choose the size of the innovation
and demonstrating that relationships might induce the producer to engage in more radical"
innovations to break through existing relationships.
5.1 Case where suppliers systematically punish producers who switch to
the innovator
Here we describe an alternative cooperative equilibrium where the supplier refuses to reengage
in cooperation if the producer switches to the innovator (that is we replace the forgiveness
condition, condition 2, by its opposite, a punishing condition which species that after a
deviation towards the innovator, the previous supplier always plays the Nash level of invest-
ment). For the sake of simplicity, we focus on parameters value for which a producer would
rather switch supplier than stay with a non cooperative good match. We also assume that
when innovators decide on how much to invest, they are unaware of when the last innovation
occurred. We then prove in Appendix A.2, the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (i) The parameter set for which innovators capture the whole market in the al-
ternative cooperative case is strictly smaller than the parameter set for which innovators capture
the whole market in the contractible or the Nash cases; in particular, the minimum technological
leap required for an innovator to capture the whole market in the alternative cooperative case
(coop2) is higher than that in the contractible or Nash cases (con; Nash): coop2 > con =
Nash. (ii) For  small enough ( <
 
=coop2   1  1  b  1  D+ b  1  D coop2 (   1)
is a su¢ cient condition), the highest equilibrium rate of innovation in the alternative coopera-
tive case is lower than the rate of innovation in the contractible case, and may even be lower
than the rate of innovation in the Nash case.
This proposition stipulates that our results carry through in this alternative equilibrium.
This is not surprising and in some sense the results are reinforced. Indeed, if a producer
20Technically, to ensure e¢ cient innovation it would still be necessary to implement a subsidy to the production
of the nal good in order to get rid of the existing monopoly distortion.
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switches to the innovator, and the innovator turns out to be a bad match, the producer would
have to su¤er additional losses in the periods following innovation as he would have to keep
looking for a good match, since the previous one would have stopped cooperating. This loss
of cooperation e¤ect pushes towards more rigid relationships in the cooperative case than in
the contractible or Nash cases. In Appendix A.2, we show that producers would switch to the
innovator if and only if
(1  b) + b  (n)
 (x)
 
 
1  D b2  1  I 1   (n)(x)+ I (y)(x)    (n)(x)
1 +   b (1  D) (1  I + I) > 
 1  (y)
 (x)
:
(17)
The third term in (17) (which is absent in (9)) reects the loss of cooperation e¤ect. It is
equal to the loss in expected prots from the risk of having to look for a new supplier in the
subsequent periods, scaled by prots in a good match when no innovation arises ( (x)).21
Therefore, Proposition (2) carries through.22
In the cooperative case, when innovations are su¢ ciently large to break-up existing rela-
tionships, the share of producers who are not in an ongoing good match relationship depends
on when the last innovation occurred. This is why to ensure a steady state rate of innovation,
we consider that innovators ignore when this happened. The expected share of producers not
in an ongoing good match relationship (!) becomes a weakly increasing function of the equi-
librium rate of innovation (as more innovation translates into a higher break-up rate of good
match relationships).23 This leaves signicant room for multiple equilibria: for instance, there
could be an equilibrium where innovation is scarce, so that most producers have found a good
match supplier and cooperation is widespread, and another equilibrium, where innovation is
frequent, many producers are not engaged in a good match relationship and cooperation is
rare.
As before the scale e¤ect pushes towards more innovation in the cooperative case than in the
Nash case, but towards less innovation than in the contractible case. The encouragement e¤ect,
the worse bad match e¤ect and now the loss of cooperation e¤ect, by making relationships more
rigid in the cooperative case, push towards less innovation in the cooperative case than in both
the Nash and contractible cases. There is however a counteracting general equilibrium e¤ect :
21The term is easy to interpret: when a producer is looking for a new supplier (which happens only if the
innovator turned to be a bad match, that is with probability b), there is a probability b that the new supplier
is a bad match, in which case prots are given by  (n) instead of  (x) in a period without innovation
(which happens with probability 1  I), and instead of  (y) in a period with innovation (which happens with
probability I), this di¤erence in prots is appropriately discounted in (17).
22Unfortunately, it is hard to compare the threshold coop and coop2. The loss of cooperation e¤ect pushes
towards coop2 > coop, however, x can be lower than in the baseline model reducing the impact of the worse
bad match e¤ect.
23The share of producers previously not in a good match is given by
D+bI(1 D)
1 b(1 D)(1 I) when  > 
NC but by
D
1 b(1 D) when  < 
NC (it is discontinuous).
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when innovations are su¢ ciently large to break up existing relationships, there will be more
producers not in an ongoing good match relationship in the cooperative than in both the
contractible and Nash cases. As an innovator captures more value from producers who are
not in an ongoing good match relationship, this is a force pushing towards more innovation in
the cooperative than in the Nash but also contractible cases. This last force is dominated by
the loss of cooperation e¤ect alone for a su¢ ciently low discount .24 This is because a lower
discount rate makes the loss-of-cooperation e¤ect more potent (since that e¤ect depends on
future outcomes).
Loss of good matches in the contractible and Nash cases. It may be the case that
even in the contractible or Nash cases, a producer cannot resume working with a supplier
after the relationship was halted, either because the two parties su¤er a utility loss, or because
the producer forgets the identity of good matches once he has stopped working with them.
Under this scenario, switching to an innovator involves losing a good match supplier also for
the contractible and Nash cases, so that a producer switches if and only if:
1  b+ b  
 
1  D b2 (1  )
1 +   b (1  D) (1  I + I) > 
 1: (18)
Therefore, even though the loss of cooperation e¤ect now applies in all cases, it is still the case
that the parameter space for which a switch occurs is larger in the contractible or Nash cases
than in the cooperative case, because cooperation is relatively lower in bad matches (n < x)
and relatively higher in outdated good matches (y  x). For a given innovation rate the share
of producers who do not know a good match at the beginning of a period in steady-state is the
same in all cases (there is no general equilibrium e¤ect). Therefore, the highest equilibrium
innovation rate is lower in the cooperative case than in the contractible one (with no condition),
and may be higher or lower than in the Nash case.
5.2 Cooperation and expanding varieties
The main proposition of the paper is that cooperation can be a poor substitute for contractibil-
ity by introducing dynamic ine¢ ciencies. Here we argue that the importance of this e¤ect may
depend on the state of development of the economy and that cooperation might provide a
better substitute for countries in phases of rapid development.
Consider an alternative model where the mass of nal good producers is increasing. This
could represent horizontal innovation, population growth or periods of increasing outsourcing
(interpreting the new nal good producers as foreign rms who decide to start acquiring
their inputs from the country of study). Every period there will be a large mass of newborn
producers, who will not already be engaged in ongoing relationships. Since cooperation raises
24This condition will be satised for reasonable parameter values since  > coop2 > (1  b+ b) 1 is necessary
for the general equilibrium e¤ect to exist, and coop2 is small.
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the amount of prots that an innovator can make from supplying producers who are not in
good matches (V s;bI;coop > V
s;b
I;Nash), it becomes more likely that cooperation raises the rate of
innovation relative to the Nash case (coop > Nash becomes more likely).
5.3 Choosing the type of innovation
In the cooperative case, innovators may be willing to react to the larger rigidity in existing
relationships (and so smaller market size), by pursuing riskier innovation strategies. To study
this in the simplest possible framework, we focus on a discrete choice of two innovation regimes:
regime 1 (1; 1) features small but frequent innovations, while regime 2 features large but rare
innovations (2 > 1; 2 < 1). We investigate when regime 1 is an equilibrium, that is assuming
that the economy is in regime 1, under which conditions an innovator has no incentive to switch
to regime 2, for the contractible, Nash and cooperative cases.25
More specically, for given (1; 1; 2) we compute the highest innovation rate in regime
2 (the infrequent regime), 2, that would make the innovator stick to the regime 1, in the
contractible (con2 ), Nash (
Nash
2 ) and cooperative (
coop
2 ) cases. The inequality 
con
2 > 
coop
2
can be interpreted as the innovator having a higher incentive to pursue larger but scarcer
innovations in the cooperative case than in the contractible case. We easily get Nash2 = 
con
2 ,
as the reward from innovation is just scaled up by a factor  (m) = (n) in the full contractible
case, the choice of regime by the innovator is not a¤ected. Hence, it is only the existence of
cooperation in long-term relationships that a¤ects the relative reward from di¤erent regimes
of innovations. We focus on the case where 1 2 (con; coop1 ), that is, in the cooperative case,
the innovator does not capture the entire market under regime 1 (coop1 is the threshold when
the innovator captures the market for an innovation rate 1). As shown in Appendix B.1, there
is a threshold ecoop such that for 2 > ecoop, the innovator could capture the entire market by
switching to regime 2.26 Denoting by (x1; y1) the equilibrium investment levels in regime 1,
we obtain the following proposition (proof in Appendix B.3).
Proposition 6 Consider the case where innovations are large enough to break up existing
relationships in regime 1 in the contracible or Nash cases but not in the cooperative case,
1 2 (con; coop1 ), then:
(i) for su¢ ciently large innovations in regime 2, 2, then the innovator has a larger in-
centive to switch to regime 2 in the cooperative case than in the contractible or Nash cases:
Nash2 = 
cont
2 > 
coop
2 .
25 In a fully endogenous setting, the choice of the size and rate of innovation would depend on how the cost
function  depend on both  and . Considering the choice between 2 regimes allows us to abstract from this
issue.
26 In general this threshold is di¤erent from coop2 , the threshold at which the innovator captures the market
with an innovation rate 2, since here we look at a one shot deviation only, so that in future periods, the
innovation rate is assumed to still be 1.
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(ii) if y1 = m, 2 > ecoop + ! (con   1) (ecoop   1) = (1   con) is a su¢ cient condition
for Nash2 = 
cont
2 > 
coop
2 , it is also a necessary condition when x1 = m.
Hence for 2 su¢ ciently large, the innovator has a higher incentive to switch to regime 2 in
the cooperative than in the contractible or Nash cases. The intuition is that in the cooperative
case, switching allows him to capture the whole market, whereas in the two other cases, he
already captures the whole market in regime 1 (the threshold needs to be higher than ecoop be-
cause when 2 is slightly above ecoop, the prots captured by the innovator from producers pre-
viously in good matches in the cooperative case are very small). The expression of the threshold
when cooperation is su¢ ciently high (y1 = m), ecoop+! (con   1) (ecoop   1) = (1   con), is
interesting by itself. It is increasing in !: if most producers are in a good match relationship,
(! low), switching in the cooperative case involves capturing most of the market size, whereas
it is already captured in the contractible case. The threshold is also decreasing in 1: if 1 is
close to ecoop, switching to the regime 2 becomes more interesting in the cooperative case than
in the contractible case. Therefore, introducing cooperation in long-term relationships may
lead to the surprising result, that when contractibility is weak, although the rate of innovation
is reduced, the size of an innovation may be larger, as long as cooperation arises.
6 When cooperation may not reduce innovation
So far we have demonstrated that cooperation in a weak contractible environment slows down
technology adoption and innovation. Yet, the type of innovation that we considered was quite
specic: we focused on general innovations that spread quickly. In this section, we demonstrate
that other types of innovation may not su¤er as much from the establishment of relational
contracts. First, we analyze the case of an innovation that di¤uses slowly, and second the case
of relationship specic innovations.
6.1 Slow di¤usion of innovations
Here we assume that instead of getting access to the frontier technology one period after an
innovation has occurred, each outdated supplier gets access to the frontier technology with
probability  2 (0; 1] in periods with no innovation and catch up with the previous frontier
technology in periods with innovation. For simplicity, we assume that when a producer and a
supplier have worked together but then stopped doing so, they can never resume any relation-
ship even in the contractible or Nash case (as suggested at the end of section 5.1, this could
result from a strong utility loss from resuming a broken relationship).27
27Without this assumption, the outside option of a producer depends on the number of good matches that he
knows and on the number of periods since the last innovation, making the analysis signicantly more complicated
in the contractible or Nash cases without adding much economic insight.
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In periods without innovation, there will be a continuum of suppliers with access to the
frontier technology (the last innovator and the rms which have successfully imitated the
frontier technology). Therefore a good match supplier with the frontier technology will only
be able to capture the surplus of a relationship with her over starting a new relationship with
another frontier rm (that is, at time t + 1, she captures V s1 At+1 =
 
V T1   V T0

At+1). If an
innovation occurs, an outdated good match supplier will capture the potential surplus of a
relationship with her over starting a new relationship with the innovator (that is, she captures
W s1At+1 = max
  
W T1   V T0

At+1; 0

); for parameter values such that the producer switches
to the innovator, this surplus is 0. Therefore the continuation value for a good match supplier
with the frontier technology at time t is given by 1 
D
1+
  
1  IV s1 + IW s1 At+1. This
continuation value is the same whether there is only one rm with the frontier technology at
time t or a continuum. It is the prospect of capturing this continuation value for the supplier
that makes cooperation possible in the rst place. Therefore, in the cooperative equilibrium,
there is a unique level of normalized investment undertaken by a good match supplier (denoted
x as before), which must still satisfy the IC constraint (5).
Consider now the case of an outdated good match at time t. As before, we denote by y
her level of normalized investment. In period t + 1, this good match supplier will become a
good match supplier with the frontier technology with probability , otherwise she stays a
good match supplier with an outdated technology. Therefore, in the cooperative equilibrium,
the IC constraint for an outdated good match is given by:
 1' (y)  1  
D
1 + 
  
1  IV s1 +   1  I (1 ) + IW s1  : (19)
As before, the encouragement e¤ect pushes towards a higher level of cooperation in outdated
relationships than in frontier relationships (the term  1 on the LHS of (19) pushes for y  x).
Yet, for  < 1, the RHS in (19) is also lower than the RHS in (5) since V s1 > W
s
1 , which pushes
towards a lower level of cooperation in outdated relationships (y  x). This occurs because
starting a new relationship with a frontier supplier is a more interesting outside option for
a producer who is working with an outdated supplier than for one who is working with a
frontier supplier. Therefore, we refer to this e¤ect as the outside optione¤ect. Overall the
relationship between x and y is ambiguous and the arrival of an innovation may weaken
cooperation in established relationship.
In Appendix B.4, we show that producers switch to the innovator in the cooperative case
if and only if
1  b+ b  (n)
 (x)
 
b2
 
1  D  1  I 1   (n)(x)+ I (y)(x)    (n)(x)
1 +   b (1  D) (1  I + I) (20)
>  1
 (y)
 (x)
  (1 )K

1   1  (y
)
 (x)

;
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with K > 0.28 This expression is the same as (17) except for the last term on the RHS. That
term captures the loss experienced by a producer who stays with an outdated good match
supplier (generating prots  1 (y)) relative to switching to a frontier good match supplier
(with prots  (x)) in all periods until either the technology di¤uses (which happens with
probability ), or another innovation occurs (which happens with probability I). Everything
else equal, slow di¤usion of innovation (a low ) encourages producers to switch to the inno-
vator. In the contractible and Nash cases on the other hand, the producer switches suppliers
when:
1  b+ b   b
2
 
1  D (1  )
1 +   b (1  D) (1  I + I) > 
 1   (1 )K  1   1 : (21)
Comparing these two expressions reveals that, as before, whether a switch occurs less or
more easily in the cooperative than in the contractible and Nash cases depend on the di¤erent
cooperation levels with a frontier good match (x), an outdated good match (y) or a bad match
(n).29 As before, x > n, and this worse bad match e¤ectencourages a producer to stick to an
outdated supplier because of the loss which he would experience if he switches and the innovator
turns out to be a bad match (both during the current period and the following ones as he looks
for a new good match). Whenever the encouragement e¤ect dominates the outside option e¤ect,
the level of cooperation is higher in outdated than frontier good matches (y  x), which also
encourages producers to stick to an outdated supplier as the loss is relatively lower in this period
and in future periods until the technology di¤uses. Otherwise, the outside option e¤ect might
induce producers to switch more easily to the innovator in the cooperative than in either the
contractible or Nash cases (so that Proposition 2 would no longer hold).30 A larger share of bad
matches b makes the worse bad match e¤ect more potent, so that in Appendix B.4 we derive
that for I su¢ ciently small, b=
 
1 +   b  1  D >  1=  1 +    1  D (1 ), is a
su¢ cient condition for cooperation to act as a barrier to entry (the parameter space for which
the innovator captures the entire market is lower in the cooperative equilibrium than in the
Nash or contractible cases).
Endogenizing the innovation rate in this set-up can be done as in section 5.1. As before,
the scale e¤ect pushes towards more innovation in the contractible than in the cooperative
case and more innovation in the cooperative than in the Nash case. As in section 5.1, the
share of producers who are not in an ongoing relationship with a good match at the beginning
28We dene K  (1 
D)(1 I)
1+ (1 D)(1 I)(1 )

1 +
b2(1 D)I
1+ b(1 D)(1 I+I)

:
29 If the producer could resume a relationship with a supplier after it has been broken in the contractible or
Nash cases, there would be no loss of cooperation e¤ect term in (21).
30We ruled out the case with no di¤usion  = 0, which makes the problem signicantly more complicated as
then the level of cooperation in outdated rms will depend on whether the producer knows if the innovator is
a good match or not. We did consider this case in a previous version of the paper and the results are available
upon request. The logic of this section carries through: the worse bad match e¤ect is still at work, but the
outside option e¤ect more easily dominates the encouragement e¤ect.
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of a period is a function of the innovation rate in the cooperative case, but now also in the
contractible and Nash cases.31 As long as y  x, the conclusions of Proposition 4 still hold,
but if the outside option e¤ect is strong enough, innovation might be higher in the cooperative
than in the contractible case now. The following remark summarizes our results.
Remark 2 (i) When innovation di¤uses slowly ( 2 (0; 1)), the level of cooperation in out-
dated good matches may be higher or lower than in frontier good matches (y 7 x). (ii) The
minimum technological leap to break existing relationship may be higher or lower in the coop-
erative than in the contractible and Nash cases (coop 7 cont = Nash for given I). If I is
small and b=
 
1 +   b  1  D > 1=  1 +    1  D (1 ), then it is harder to break
existing relationships in the cooperative case coop > cont = Nash. (iii) The highest equilib-
rium innovation rate in the cooperative case may be higher or lower than in the contractible or
Nash cases (coop 7 cont and coop 7 Nash), but if y  x, it is lower than in the contractible
case coop < cont.
Therefore our earlier results are generalized to this case but only if innovations di¤use
su¢ ciently rapidly. How fast innovations di¤use depend on technological and institutional
characteristics, for instance weak intellectual property rights may favor rapid technological
di¤usion. Then, our results suggest that weak contractibility is particularly damaging to an
economy where IPRs are poorly enforced.
6.2 Innovations within relationships
In this section we show that the establishment of a cooperative equilibrium in a weak con-
tractibility environment may encourage relationship-specic innovations. We depart from our
baseline model in two ways. First, the technology level At is now kept constant (normalized to
1). Second, in a good match, a producer and a supplier can jointly undertake a relationship-
specic innovation which increases the relationship-specic productivity of the supplier from
1 to  > 1. We refer to a relationship where this innovation has succeeded as an augmented
match. To become an augmented match with probability I , the producer and suppliers have
to spend  
 
I

units of nal good. Whether the innovation succeeds or not is revealed at the
beginning of the period, and the investment is undertaken after the nature of the match is
revealed. In order to focus on the issue of contractibility of the intermediate input provided
by the supplier (which we could also interpret as e¤ort), we assume that the R&D investment
 
 
I

is contractible, so that its level is chosen so as to maximize the joint expected value of
the relationship.
31Therefore, this general equilibrium e¤ect no longer systematically pushes towards more innovation in the
cooperative than contractible and Nash cases. Instead it pushes towards more innovation when producers switch
to innovators. It may also still generate multiple equilibria.
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As before, producers switch suppliers until they nd a good match. In the cooperative case,
good match suppliers are willing to cooperate as mush as possible until a deviation occurs.
We focus on parameters such that if cooperation ceases, the producers best option is always
to look for a new good match (alternatively we may assume as above that there is a strong
utility cost of resuming a broken relationship). We denote the normalized level of investment
in a good match as y, which is constant as long as a good match does not get augmented.
Once a match has become augmented, R&D investments are no longer necessary, and in the
cooperative equilibrium, the level of cooperation changes to x (also constant). Therefore the
equilibrium is fully characterized by the equilibrium values: I , y and x. The structure of
the equilibrium in the contractible and Nash cases is similar but the investment levels are xed
at m and n respectively. In Appendix B.5, we solve for the equilibrium and demonstrate the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 The equilibrium innovation rate in the cooperative case coop satises
+ D
1  D + 
coop

 0 (coop)   (coop) =

    (y
)
 (x)

 (x) ; (22)
while in the contractible case and Nash cases it satises
+ D
1  D + 
I

 0
 
I
    I = (   1)  (z) ; (23)
with z = m in the contractible case and z = n in the Nash case. If   (1 + ) (1  b) =  b  1  D,
then x  y, so that coop > Nash and coop 7 cont.
The innovation rate depends on the di¤erence in the prots of an augmented match relative
to a good match. Therefore, the comparison between the innovation rates in the cooperative
case and the two other cases is governed as before by a scale e¤ect and by the relative levels of
cooperation within augmented relative to good matches (x and y). The comparison between
x and y is generally ambiguous. On one hand an encouragement e¤ect pushes towards more
cooperation when productivity is lower, because the prospect of an innovation increases the
reward from cooperation relative to the incentive to deviate. On the other hand, the value
that a supplier captures in an augmented match is larger than the one she captures in a good
match (as in both cases the outside option is to start a new relationship). The proposition
provides a su¢ cient condition under which the encouragement e¤ect is dominated, resulting
in a higher level of cooperation in augmented matches. This directly implies that cooperation
fosters innovation relative to the Nash level. It may even lead to higher levels of innovation
than in the contractible case (coop > cont occurs for instance if x = m but y < m).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we show that the development of implicit contracts in a context of poor con-
tractibility is a poor substitute for strong institutions for the development of broad, general
purpose innovations, particularly when innovations get easily imitated. In a nutshell, our argu-
ment goes as follows: incomplete contractibility leads rms to engage in cooperative long-term
relationships, which can help overcome the classic underinvestment issue associated with the
lack of contractibility. However, it is only in relationships which are a good t, that is, in
relationships where parties understand that they are going to keep working together for a long
time, that cooperation is sustainable in the rst place. Consequently, switching to a new sup-
plier becomes a riskier activity because if the new supplier is a bad t, cooperation will not
take place. More rigid relationships, in return, slow down the process of creative destruction.
Once innovation decisions are endogenized, the dynamic growth costs can be su¢ ciently large
to overcome the static gains of cooperation. Our model predicts that with poor formal insti-
tutions but informal contracting, relationships are more rigid and last longer and innovation
spreads is scarcer than with good formal institutions. In addition innovations may be larger
when they happen.
The negative e¤ects of cooperation can be attenuated in countries far from the technological
frontier, or if imitation is slow as in this case the long-standing presence of rms with better
technologies can weaken cooperation within established relationship where the supplier has
only access to an outdated technology. In addition, cooperation may boost relationship-specic
innovations to the detriment of general purpose innovations.
An interesting extension to our analysis would be to include foreign outsourcing as issues of
incomplete contractibility and long-term relationships may be even more stringent when a rm
is dealing with a supplier in a di¤erent country, as the rm may be less familiar with the local
judicial system. More generally, the idea that the cooperation in long-term relationships can
lead to dynamic ine¢ ciencies can be exploited in di¤erent contexts, varying both the reason
for why rms develop long-term relationships and the source of the dynamic ine¢ ciency. For
instance, long-term relationships may prevent rms from adjusting quickly enough to business
cycles or trade shocks.
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A Main Appendix
A.1 Cooperative equilibrium characterization
We prove part a) of Proposition 1 and lemma 1. The proof proceeds as follows
1) We conjecture an equilibrium in particular with the two constants x and y,
2) We show lemma 1 in the cooperative case,
3) We derive the general form of the IC constraint
4) We derive the special form of the IC constraint for the parameter set where a producer
will always rather look for a new supplier if any deviation occurs.
5) We refer the reader to the Online Appendix on blog.iese.edu/olsen/research where we
show that the equilibrium exists, derive the IC constraint under alternative parameter sets and
show that any equilibrium must be of the same form as described in step 1 below (part b of
the proposition).
A.1.1 Step 1. Description of the equilibrium
The incentive constraint must be of the following form:
After a history of ht when a good match supplier makes her investment decision she can
invest n instead of the prescribed z (ht), which would increase ex-post prots this period by
' (z (ht))Ak (ht), where Ak (ht) is the technology of supplier and
' (z)  R (n)  n  (R (z)  z)
Denoting by I 2 f0; 1g either no new innovation (I = 0) or a new innovation (I = 1) we
can express the incentive constraint as:
' (z (ht))Ak (ht)  1  
D
1 + 
 (A.1)
  
1  IV s;k (ht [ fz (ht)g [ fI = 0g) + IV s;k (ht [ fz (ht)g [ fI = 1g)
    1  IV s;k (ht [ fng [ fI = 0g) + IV s;k (ht [ fng [ fI = 1g)

;
where V s;k (h) denotes the value of the supplier after history h (The continuation value after
a deviation other than n could be di¤erent, but the producer has no reason not to punish any
deviation in the same way so we focus on the incentive not to play n).
We conjecture an equilibrium with the following restrictions on strategies (in the Online
Appendix we demonstrate that all equilibria satisfying conditions 1 - 4 must take this form).
1. Investment levels in all good matches are given by two constant x and y, where the
former is undertaken when the supplier has access to the best technology and the latter
when he does not, as long as no deviation has occurred in the relationship between the
producer and the supplier;
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2. Investment levels are at the rst best level if possible and otherwise the IC constraint
binds;
3. Producers stay with the same supplier until an innovation or a deviation occurs, if an
innovation occurs, the producer may or may not switch, but if he switches and the
innovator turned out to be a bad match, he goes back to his old supplier;
4. Producers are just indi¤erent between choosing the supplier they are supposed to work
with on equilibrium path and choosing the second best supplier, the second best
supplier is just indi¤erent between being chosen and not being chosen by the producer;
5. If a supplier deviates once, investment is at the Nash level in any further interaction, and
- without loss of generality - if the producer deviates (by switching to another supplier
who is not an innovator that turned out to be a bad match) investment is also at the
Nash level in any future interaction.
It is not complicated to demonstrate that an equilibrium with these characteristics will
satisfy conditions 1 - 4. But we still have two things to show, rst why is it possible to satisfy
part a) of condition 1 (that is why is it possible that the level of investment will be the same
when the producer knows several good matches and when he does not), and second that such
an equilibrium always exist). We proceed to prove lemma 1
A.1.2 Step 2. Proof of lemma 1
We consider a producer who knows a good match supplier with whom no deviation has occurred
and we study whether the producer would want to switch to the innovator or not.32 We
normalize values of rms by the level of the frontier technology and use the notations V zi to
denote the value of a producer (z = p), a supplier (z = s) or the total value of the producer
and the supplier (z = T ) in a relationship which is new i = 0 or old i = 1 in a period without
innovation. In a period with innovation we will similarly use W zi to denote the value with an
outdated supplier and V z;pI to denote the value with the innovator (where p = g is used if the
producer was in a good match - who did not deviate- in the previous period and p = b is used
otherwise). When an innovation occurs the value of a good match supplier does not fall to 0,
as the producer may come back to the supplier if the innovator turns out to be a bad match.
We denote the expected value of such a supplier by V sA.
The innovator and the old supplier enter in Bertrand Competition, the old supplier would
be willing to o¤er a transfer that would guarantee herself at least V sA in order to keep the
32This analysis always applies on path. O¤ path it also applies except when the producer already knows a
good match with whom a deviation has occurred and the value of a relationship with the innovator is lower
than the value of staying with this good match.
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producer, hence SPNE requires that:
W s1  V sA: (A.2)
Moreover Bertrand Competition ensures that the supplier with whom the relationship is the
highest captures the entire benet of the relationship over the second best one, hence the value
of the producer whether he switches supplier or not is the same:33
V p;gI = W
p
1 : (A.3)
The producer ends up switching if the highest amount that the innovator can o¤er is higher
than the highest amount that the old supplier can o¤er, that is if if the total value of the
producer and the innovator (V T;gI ) is higher than the surplus value of the old relationship
(W T1   V sA).34
V T;gI > W
T
1   V sA: (A.4)
The total value of a relationship with the old supplier is given by:
W T1 =
1

 (y) +
1  D
1 + 
  
1  IV T1 + IW T1  : (A.5)
If the producer sticks with the old supplier, the relationship will produce prots 1 (y
) in the
rst period, in the next period if no innovation occurs, the total value is given by V T1 , and if
innovation occurs the old supplier captures W s1 and the producer would get V
p;g
I if he switches
and W p1 otherwise, but the two are equal (thanks to (A.3)) so total value is W
T .
Similarly the total value of a relationship with the innovator is given by:
V T;gI = (1  b)  (x) + (1  b)
1  D
1 + 
  
1  IV T1 + IW T1  (A.6)
+ b (n) + b
1  D
1 + 
  
1  IV p1 + IW p1  :
With probability 1 b the relationship turns out to be good delivering prots  (x) in the rst
period and with continuation value V T1 if no innovation occurs and W
T
1 if innovation occurs.
With probability b, the relationship turns out to be a bad match, the continuation value for
the supplier is then zero, and the producer goes back to his old good match supplier, so that
his value is V p1 if no innovation occurs and W
p
1 if innovation occurs.
33Condition 1 plays a role here. Indeed, if the producer does not switch and the rst best is achieved, the
producer can capture more than V T;gI -by having strategies where cooperation would cease if the supplier were
to ask for an ex-ante transfer lower than the equilibrium value and were still chosen. Condition 1 precisely
rules out such scheme. Regardless, this does not a¤ect the analysis for whether a producer switches or not. -
When the rst best is not reached, such schemes are already ruled out by the bilateral rationality condition, as
granting the largest share to the supplier guarantees the largest amount of cooperation.
34Technically this is derived under the condition that the value a good match old supplier is willing to o¤er
is (weakly) higher than the value another outdated supplier would be willing to o¤er. We show in part 3 that
this is necessarily true.
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This leaves us with the expected value to the supplier from the possibility that the producer
returns, V sA as the only missing element. If the producer switches, the current prots enjoyed
by the old supplier are zero, but with probability b, the innovator will turn out to be a bad
match, in which case the old supplier will get V s1 if no innovation occurs and W
s
1 if innovation
occurs, hence:
V sA =
1  D
1 + 
b
  
1  IV s1 + IW s1  : (A.7)
Now combining (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7) one gets:
V T;gI  
 
W T1   V sA

= (1  b)  (x) + b (n)  1

 (y) ; (A.8)
which proves lemma 1.
A.1.3 Step 3. The general form of the incentive constraint
Using the notation and logic of the proceeding section we can rewrite (A.1) as:
' (x)  1  
D
1 + 
  
1  IV s1 + IW s1     1  IV sN + IW sN ; (A.9)
 1' (y)  1  
D
1 + 
  
1  IV s1 + IW s1     1  IV sN + IW sN ;
where V sN and W
s
N are the value the supplier would get if he deviates (and investment would
then be given by the Nash level), in periods where, respectively there is no innovation and
there is innovation. If the supplier cooperates, her value in the following period is given by
V s1 if there is no innovation and W
s
N if there is innovation. The factor 
 1 on the LHS of the
second IC constraint comes from the fact that the technology of the outdated supplier is only
 1A. We will refer to a good match supplier who has ceased to cooperate as a deviator.
Combining (A.2), (A.3) and (A.8), we then get (still as long as switching to the innovator
is a better option than switching to a potential deviator when the producer knows one):
W s1 = V
s
A +

1

 (y)  ((1  b)  (x) + b (n))
+
; (A.10)
where X+  max fX; 0g
Using equation (A.7) and (A.10) we get: 
1  IV s1 + IW s1 (A.11)
=
1 + 
1 +   b (1  D) I
  
1  IV s1 + I 1 (y)  ((1  b)  (x) + b (n))
+!
;
Finally note that V T1 must satisfy:
V T1 =  (x
) +
1  D
1 + 
  
1  IV T1 + IW T1  ; (A.12)
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which combined with (A.5) leads to:
V T1 =
 
1 +    1  D I (x) +  1  D I (y)
1 +   (1  D) (1  I + I) : (A.13)
If the producer does not already know a deviator, we necessarily get through Bertrand com-
petition:
V p1 = V
T;n
0 and V
s
1 = V
T
1   V T;n0 , (A.14)
where V T;n0 is the value of starting a new relationship when the producer knows a deviator.
Indeed, the outside option for the producer is to start a new relationship, but should he do so,
he would now know a deviator, namely the good match he was previously working with. If the
producer knows a deviator, then his second best option will either be to resume a relationship
with the deviator or to start a new relationship, now knowing two deviators, so that we get,
through Bertrand Competition:
V s1 = V
T
1  max

V TN ; V
T;n
0

; (A.15)
where V TN denotes the joint value of a relationship with the deviator.
As mentioned in the text, depending on parameters, there is a number of di¤erent cases to
consider. In order to save space we will consider only the case where in case of a deviation the
producer will always seek out a new producer. The other cases are considered in the Online
Appendix. The main results of the paper hold in all cases.
A.1.4 Step 4 in a special case: When a deviation always leads the producer to
try out a di¤erent supplier
Assume that in periods without innovation, the producer would always rather try out a new
supplier than a deviator, and, in periods with innovation, should the producer would prefer
both the innovator or an outdated new supplier than an (outdated) deviator. That is, we
assume:
V TN < V
T
0 and W
T
N < W
T
0 : (A.16)
and we need not index V T0 and W
T
0 by n as whether a producer knows a deviator or not is now
irrelevant. Note that, as the producer, will never return to a supplier the value from deviating
is zero (Such that for the two rightmost terms in equation (A.9)
 
1  IV sN + IW sN = 0).
We can therefore focus on
 
1  IV s1 + IW s1 which is given by equation (A.11). Using that
V s1 = V
T
1   V T0 (from equation A.14) we use that by denition:
V T0 = (1  b)V T1 + b (n) + b
1  D
1 + 
  
1  IV T0 + IW T0  ; (A.17)
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such that with the aid of equation (A.13) we need only an expression for the total value of
starting a new relationship with an outdated supplier. This is given by the value V T0 minus
the expected loss from lower productivity:
W T0 = V
T
0   (1  b)
 
(x)   1 (y)  b  1   1 (n) :
Combining these expressions we nd 
1  IV s1 + IW s1 =
1 + 
1 +   b (1  D) I
0@  1  I b((1+ b(1 D)I)((x) (n))+b(1 D)I((y) (n)))1+ b(1 D)(1 I+I)
+I

1
 (y
)  ((1  b)  (x) + b (n))
+
1A ;
which combined with the incentive constraint in equation (A.9) leads to equation (10) in the
main text. We derive the incentive constraints for the exhaustive set of cases in Appendix B.1.
Finally, to show the existence of the equilibrium, we need to show that the investment levels
x and y exist, which we do for all possible cases.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
In this appendix we consider the case where the strategy of suppliers is to punish the producer
- by playing the Nash strategy - if we he switches to an innovator that turns out to be a bad
match. We derive expression (17) in the special case in which case the expected value of a new
relationship is higher than remaining with a supplier who is punishing by investing the Nash
level, such that if the innovator turns out to be a bad match the producer will seek out a new
supplier rather than stick with the old one.
Compare to the situation in Appendix A.1, if the producer switches the old supplier lose
all its value, hence V sA = 0. The producer will now switch if and only if:
V T;gI > W
T
1 ; (A.18)
that is the total value of a new relationship with the innovator is higher than the total value
of a relationship with the old supplier instead of (A.4). If the innovator turns out to be a bad
match, the producer will try another new supplier in the following period, so the total value
of the relationship with the innovator does not depend on whether the producer already knew
a good match or not:
V T;gI = V
T;b
I = V0:
Equation (A.6) is replaced by:
V T;gI = V
T
0 = (1  b)  (x) + (1  b)
1  D
1 + 
  
1  IV T1 + IW T1  (A.19)
+ b (n) + b
1  D
1 + 
  
1  IV T0 + IW T0  : (A.20)
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Analogous to the analysis in Appendix A.1 we use that (A.5), (A.7), and (A.12) still hold to
get:
V T;gI  W T1 = (1  b)  (x) + b (n)   1 (y) (A.21)
  b
2
 
1  D   1  I ( (x)   (n)) + I ( (y)   (n))
1 +   b (1  D) (1  I + I) ;
so that a producer in a good match will switch to the innovator if and only if (17) holds, which
denes a coop2. Note, that equation (A:21) di¤ers from equation (8) only in the last term,
and using Lemma 1 it follows that coop2 > con = Nash.
To show that the incentive to innovate is lower we need the fraction of the rms that are
in good matches. In all cases, a producer in a bad match switch. If  < coop2 then only
producers in bad matches in the cooperate equilibrium will switch, implying that in steady
state (weakly) more producers will be in good matches in the cooperative equilibrium than
in the contractible equilibrium. As the extra benet for the innovator from contractibility is
higher for good matches than bad matches, it follows that the incentive to innovate is higher
in the contractible case, coop2 < con.
Now, consider the case where  > coop2, such that good matches remain with the same
producer when innovation takes place. Use the fact that in the contractible case a fraction
~!c = 
D
1 b(1 D) of producers will not be in good relationships, whereas in the noncontractible
case a fraction ~!nc =
D+bI(1 D)
1 b(1 D)(1 I) will not be in a good relationship. Inserting into the
expressions for expected prots in the contractible and noncontractible case, respectively:
(~!c (   1) (1  b+ b) + (1  ~!c) ((1  b+ b)    1))  (m)
Cooperative case:
~!nc ((1  b) ( (x)  (y)) + b (   1)  (n))
+ (1  ~!nc) ( (1  b)  (x) + b (n)  (y))
  (1  ~!nc) 
 
1  D b2   1  I ( (x)   (n)) + I ( (y)   (n))
1 +   b (1  D) (1  I + I) ;
straightforward, but somewhat tedious algebra demonstrates that the condition
coop2
 
1 +   b  1  D  1 + coop2 (   1) <   1  b  1  D is su¢ cient to ensure that
the incentive to innovate is lower: coop2 < con:
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